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Larry Alexander argues that liberalism is internally incoherent because
it contains a paradox: it is committed to toleration, but if it tolerates 
illiberal ideas and practices it betrays itself.1 
The paradox does not exist. Liberalism aims to tolerate as much
diversity as it can consistent with the preservation of the liberal project.
It has distinctive reasons to tolerate illiberal ideas, since it aims to be 
adopted by the citizenry consciously and with a full understanding of the 
* © 2017 Andrew Koppelman. John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor 
(by courtesy) of Political Science, Department of Philosophy Affiliated Faculty, Northwestern
University.  Thanks to Tom Gaylord for research assistance, and to the audience at the 
Feb. 2016 symposium, “Can Liberals Be Tolerant? Should They Be?,” at the University
of San Diego School of Law.  Parts of this paper previously appeared in the following 
articles: Andrew Koppelman, You’re All Individuals: Brettschneider on Free Speech, 79
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1023 (2014); Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism 
in Free Speech Theory, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 647 (2013); Andrew Koppelman, Waldron, 
Responsibility-Rights, and Hate Speech, 43 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 1201 (2012). 
1. See generally Larry Alexander, Free Speech and ‘Democratic Persuasion’: A 
Response to Brettschneider, in  PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 379
(Rowan Cruft et al. eds. 2015). 
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alternatives. How much diversity can, in practice, be tolerated is a 
contingent question dependent on the facts of any particular time and
place.  Whether domestic fascists, for example, need to be suppressed in
order to avoid disaster, is a matter of prediction based on local knowledge.
It is not a philosophical question.
I. ALEXANDER’S ALLEGED PARADOX
Alexander’s most concise statement of the alleged paradox:
If it outlaws illiberalism, its credentials as a liberal state appear to be undermined. 
If it permits illiberalism, it licenses Robert Frost’s derogatory quip that liberalism
can’t take its own side in an argument.  Either way, liberalism appears self-
contradictory and incoherent.  It must either betray its principles or betray itself
(and thereby betray its principles).  Liberalism both appears to be possible—
we’ve seen it done—and impossible (it can’t be done).2 
The upshot is that liberalism can’t coherently be theorized. “Liberalism,
and its central liberties of freedom of expression, religion, and association,
is a theoretical contradiction.  Its successes are instead pragmatic ones.”3 
Liberalism refers to the idea that the purpose of government is not the 
promotion of religious, moral, or martial virtue, or the aggrandizement of 
the rulers or their race, but rather peace, prosperity, intellectual progress,
and personal liberty.  Liberal practices antedate liberal theories: people began 
focusing on these ends, and experiencing their value, before theorists worked 
out a story of why this was a good way for governments to operate.4 The
theories attempt to systematically state and justify the practice.
A central part of liberal practice has been the effort to appreciate human 
diversity, to sympathetically understand the points of view even of those 
most bitterly opposed to that practice.5  This tendency is what Frost had 
in mind when he famously said: “A liberal is a man too broadminded to
take his own side in a quarrel.”6  But Frost didn’t think that this could be
 2. Id. at 379. 
3. Id. at 387. The assumption that pragmatic successes cannot be theorized implies
an unusually modest sense of the possibilities of theory. 
4. See generally DEIRDRE MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS
CAN’T EXPLAIN THE MODERN WORLD (2010).
5. See, for example, Gitta Sereny’s exquisitely probing interviews with Nazi war 
criminals, GITTA SERENY, ALBERT SPEER: HIS BATTLE WITH TRUTH (1995); GITTA SERENY,
INTO THAT DARKNESS: FROM MERCY KILLING TO MASS MURDER, A STUDY OF FRANZ
STANGL, THE COMMANDANT OF TREBLINKA (2d ed. 1995).  One benefit of this sympathetic 
engagement with evil is that it counteracts the illusion of one’s own incorruptibility, which 
itself can license considerable evil.  See Andrew Koppelman, Reading Lolita at Guantanamo,
or, This Page Cannot Be Displayed, DISSENT, Spring 2006, at 64. 
6. It probably was not original with him.  See Barry Popik, “A Liberal Is a Man Too
Broadminded To Take His Own Side in a Quarrel,” BIG APPLE (Dec. 6, 2009), 
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developed into a serious indictment of liberalism: “I’m not saying I’m not 
one myself.  That was what the war of our Revolution was.”7 
Liberalism faces a paradox only if it stands for principles that cannot be 
consistently followed.  It is committed to a kind of evaluative neutrality
in certain contexts, but this is paradoxical only if the specification of that 
neutrality is inconsistent with liberal practice.  An apparent paradox may
merely reveal the need for further specification. 
Alexander elaborates: 
On the one hand, the freedoms that are emblematic of liberalism—the freedoms
of expression, religion, and association—all appear to require a governmental 
stance of evaluative neutrality. . . . “Freedom of expression for those with whom 
the government agrees” is not freedom of expression . . . 
Yet, here is the problem.  Any philosophical account of political morality will, 
perforce, take a stand on what is true, right, and valuable and what is not. It
will and must be “partisan” in favor of its own conclusions.  Thus, it must regard
as error and possibly malign those ideas that it rejects.
Liberalism in any of its renditions is no different.  If liberalism is the correct
political morality, all positions inconsistent with its tenets are incorrect.  There is 
no neutral ground in these matters.8 
There is no paradox. Liberalism is committed to a kind of evaluative 
neutrality at the operational level with respect to the exercise of these
freedoms.  Your right to speak, for instance, is unaffected by whether you
agree or disagree with liberalism. Viewpoint-based restrictions on speech 
http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/a_liberal_is_a_man_too_broad 
_minded_to_take_his_own_side_in_a_quarrel/ [https://perma.cc/R3MF-X3EE].
7. George Monteiro, Robert Frost’s Liberal Imagination, 28 IOWA REV. 104, 127 
(1998) (quoting Robert Frost, Appearance at the National Poetry Festival in Washington 
(Fall 1962)).  Frost also declared: 
Now, speaking of liberal, my gibes and my jokes - one of them is to call all my
liberal friends Dover Beachcombers. . . . But now, Matthew Arnold, with all my
joking and gibing about him, is one of my “greats.” I can tell he is, because I 
quote him so often . . . And the word about his being a liberal comes to me when
he says that we intellectuals “Dejectedly take our seat on the intellectual throne.”
That’s a very liberal attitude.  Nearly every liberal that I know of has a tendency
when his enemy works up against him, stirs up against him, to try to remember
if he isn’t more in the wrong than the enemy. I said in two lines of poetry a long 
time ago that a liberal is a person who can’t take his own side in a quarrel. That’s 
all, but I can say better things of a liberal than that. 
Id. at 125 (quoting Frost, supra).
8. LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 148–49
(2005). 
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are categorically invalid.  Even Nazis have a right to free speech.  But on 
the level of political philosophy, including the question of what rights there 
are and how to specify them, there is no evaluative neutrality in liberalism.
Nazis are protected for reasons Nazis find repellent. 
I can take my own side in an argument without needing to hit anyone 
who disagrees.9  As it happens I am happy to talk with Larry Alexander, and
grateful that he’s willing to talk to me.  I believe that these conversations, 
which force me to defend my ideas (and Larry is pretty damn forceful) make
me a better thinker and a better person. All this even though I’m right and 
he’s wrong.10 
Alexander writes: “If it permits illiberalism, it licenses Robert Frost’s
derogatory quip.”11  He does not explain what his phrase “permit illiberalism”
means. It might mean permitting practices that liberalism’s own commitments 
prohibit, such as burning heretics. Alexander understands that liberalism 
won’t allow this.  If “a religious group believes in the necessity of theocratic 
rather than democratic rule,” liberalism “cannot allow that group to actualize 
what its religion demands.”12  No incoherence here.13 
On the other hand, liberalism will tolerate the dissemination of illiberal
ideas, hate speech, etc.  But it will only tolerate harmless Nazis who merely
march around in silly uniforms.14 
9. This point is elaborated, and several arguments on which Alexander might be 
relying are refuted, in Jeremy Waldron, Toleration: Is There a Paradox?, (NYU Sch. of
Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 12-75, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2196135 [https://perma.cc/848M-GFUW]. 
10. The incoherence is present only if one presumes that the human will finds
intolerable the existence of other beings with free will.  Jean-Paul Sartre argued this, 
Andrew Koppelman, Sex Equality and/or the Family: From Bloom vs. Okin to Rousseau
vs. Hegel, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 399, 427–28 (1992), but he wasn’t a liberal. 
11. Alexander, supra note 1, at 379. 
12. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 149. 
13. Karl Popper, perhaps the first to use the term “paradox” in this context, thought 
that there was a potential “paradox of tolerance,” but that it was a danger that could be 
avoided: “If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not 
prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the
tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.”  KARL POPPER, 1 THE OPEN SOCIETY
AND ITS ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF PLATO 265 (5th ed. 1966).  By “onslaught” he evidently
was referring to actions more potent than illiberal speech.  “In this formulation, I do not
imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as
long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, 
suppression would certainly be most unwise.”  Id.
14. Stephen Macedo observes that American Nazis must “respect the property, the 
political rights, and freedoms of Jewish Americans,” they have to keep order when they
march, and otherwise they must “be law-abiding Nazis” or else suffer at the hands of the 
law.  In short, “they cannot be Nazis at all but only play at it.” STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL 
VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 260 
(1991). 
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John Rawls offered a simple and elegant case for toleration of the 
intolerant.15  He thought that the liberty of intolerant groups “should be 
restricted only when the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe that their
own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in danger.”16  The
intolerant have no right to complain because “[a] person’s right to complain
is limited to violations of principles he acknowledges himself.”17 Nonetheless, 
they should be tolerated if this is safely possible:  “justice is infringed whenever
equal liberty is denied without sufficient reason.”18  In assessing the dangers,
“the natural strength of free institutions must not be forgotten.”19 
This Article argues that liberalism has even stronger reasons than Rawls 
articulates to protect the speech of the intolerant: it aims to expose citizens 
to illiberal ideas so that they can choose liberalism deliberately.20  The 
availability of bad ideas is a good for the liberal.  There are also other familiar 
arguments for free speech, rooted in the unhappy history of government
censorship. But Rawls’s case is coherent on its own terms.
Alexander writes: “Liberalism can be neutral only toward those religions
and religious views that are compatible with the tenets of liberalism [in
practice, he should have written: they can teach intolerance, as the Catholic
Church did in America in the nineteenth century, so long as they are
impotent to carry it out].  Which is to say that if liberalism is defined in 
part by neutrality toward religious beliefs, liberalism is impossible.”21  It
depends on what kind of “neutrality toward religious beliefs” liberalism 
is committed to.  Neutrality is available in a huge variety of specifications.22 
The peculiar American form of liberal neutrality regards religion as 
15. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 193 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999). 
16. Id.  Alexander writes: “The relation between liberalism and illiberal views, 
therefore, if liberalism is to avoid paradox and incoherence, must be a modus vivendi 
relation of qualified and limited tolerance rather than a relation in which illiberal views 
have rights as a matter of principle.”  Larry Alexander, Alexander on Koppelman on 
Alexander, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 339 (2017). Here Alexander assumes that “a matter of
principle” must be absolutely consequence-insensitive.  This passage of Rawls, however, states
a principle in the ordinary semantic sense of that word. 
17. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 190. 
18. Id. at 191. 
19. Id. at 193. 
20. See discussion infra at Part II. 
21. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 164. 
22. See Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POLITICS 633, 635 
(2004). 
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a good, and, because that good can be corrupted by state manipulation, 
bars the state from any explicit endorsement of religious propositions.23 
Of course, any human behavior whatsoever impliedly rejects some
religious propositions.  This cannot be impermissible.  Ought implies can. 
Government can and does give reasons for what it does without embedding 
its actions in any particular religious narrative.  It is possible to defend the
law against murder without saying anything at all about Aztec theology. 
Perhaps some religious orthodoxy is in some sense implicit in the stop
sign at an intersection; at a minimum, it excludes the proposition that God 
wants you to speed through the intersection without slowing down. But 
there are many theologies that can and do coincide in rejecting this
proposition. People with radically differing theological views can have
adequate reasons for obeying both laws.24  Whatever objections one might
have to carrying on in this way, it is not paradoxical. 
Similarly, with Alexander’s allegation of paradox within liberals’ embrace
of free speech: 
Freedom of expression is paradoxical within any plausible normative theory.
That is because the requirement of evaluative neutrality is the core of any right of
freedom of expression, but evaluative neutrality cannot coexist with any normative
theory.  Any normative theory, liberal or not, will perforce take positions on what 
ought to be done given our best judgment of what the world is like.  To the extent
that expression . . . threatens to produce states of affairs inconsistent with those 
the normative theory prescribes, to that extent the normative theory must, as
a matter of logical consistency, rule the expression to be pernicious and of negative 
value.25 
Alexander is correct that no theory of free speech can maintain absolute
epistemological humility.  Even a theory that made freedom of expression
so absolute as to override all other human interests “would face a paradox 
in dealing with expression that threatened to undermine it.”26 
Alexander’s point is devastating only if free speech theory must take
the form he describes, as committed to absolute evaluative neutrality.
However, the style of reasoning that is officially committed to absolute 
evaluative neutrality is a fairly recent development in free speech theory.27
 23. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 66 (2013); 
Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1831, 1907 (2009). 
24. Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven 
D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729, 734 (2003). 
25. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 177. 
26. Id.
27. Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism in Free Speech
Theory, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 647, 656–58, 706–07 (2013).  And neutralist liberalism, which
disclaims reliance on any contestable conception of the good, is a similarly recent, related
development. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191–92 (1985). 
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Milton, Mill, Hand, Holmes, Brandeis, Meiklejohn, and Emerson were 
not committed to absolute evaluative neutrality.  They did aspire to a field 
of neutrality—any conception of any kind of liberty will do that—but within
limits.  They were unapologetically devoted to certain substantive values.
It was from those substantive values that they derived their commitment to free
speech, and so they had no problem limiting speech in the way that Alexander 
describes.28 
Alexander offers a different formulation of liberalism that is more faithful 
to the actual liberal tradition (rather than certain failed late-twentieth-
century attempts to codify that tradition):  liberalism may be understood 
as “a way of life, a vision of the Good, a partisan view among partisan
views.”29  It strives to realize that way of life, to create and maintain a free
society. And so a line must be drawn: “To the extent that expression . . . 
threatens to produce states of affairs inconsistent with those the normative 
theory prescribes, to that extent the normative theory must, as a matter of
logical consistency, rule the expression to be pernicious and of negative
value.”30 
Here, normative political philosophy cannot offer rules but only standards.
There is no way to know which expression threatens to bring about those 
bad states of affairs without local knowledge of the circumstances in 
which the expression occurs.  Nazi speech is, of course, censored in Germany
 28. Id.
 29. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 169.  He declares it unattractive because
“cosmopolitanism inevitably tends to homogenize and shallow out the various ways of 
life.”  Id.  I have responded: 
This is Nietzsche’s old complaint that a liberal society does not produce heroic
or admirable characters, but merely meek bourgeoisie who do not take anything 
very seriously.  I will here simply record my view that liberalism has its own heroes
and deeply felt ideals (some of which are described here), and that Alexander
does not specify which alternative to liberalism he finds preferable.  Some admirers 
of Nietzsche have been less circumspect.
Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance, supra note 27, at 729–30 n.465. 
30. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 177. 
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and Austria,31 and it is far from clear that this is not justified.32  The intolerant 
sect, Rawls sensibly observes, “presents a practical dilemma which philosophy 
alone cannot resolve.  Whether the liberty of the intolerant should be 
limited to preserve freedom under a just constitution depends on the 
circumstances.”33 
By considering the ideals specific to the liberal way of life, we can add 
two provisos to Rawls.  First, liberalism demands that some dangerous 
speech be tolerated, because it aims that, to the extent feasible, citizens be 
exposed to all manner of ideas, even evil ones.  Second, although speech
may legitimately be suppressed when this is necessary to prevent harm,
one kind of disutility cannot even be counted as a harm for purposes of
deciding whether any particular speech is harmful:  the moral distress induced
by exposure to unwelcome ideas. 
II. NOT BY THEIR PRINCIPLES, BUT BY OURS
The importance of exposure to illiberal ideas has been a persistent 
theme in free speech theory.  There is nothing paradoxical about it, any
more than there is anything paradoxical about a general studying the enemy’s 
captured plans.  Consider the role of antiliberal ideas in three major figures
in the free speech tradition: John Milton, John Stuart Mill, and Alexander
Meiklejohn.
 31. See  LEGISLATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION NORMS 328–30 (Nina Osin & Dina Porat eds., 2005) (German 
statutes); Id. at 86–87 (Austrian statutes); ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 166–67 (2d
ed. 2005); Walter F. Murphy, Excluding Political Parties: Problems for Democratic and 
Constitutional Theory, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE – A
GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 173, 180–81 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds. 
1993).
32. DAVID ART, THE POLITICS OF THE NAZI PAST IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 55 
(2006).
In 1952, 37 percent of Germans agreed with the statement that “it would be 
better for Germany not to have any Jews in the country,” while only 20 percent 
disagreed . . .  In 1953, 55 percent of Germans disagreed with the statement that 
“German soldiers of the last war can be reproached for their conduct in the occupied
countries.” 
Id.  Neither of these questions concerned free speech, but both answers are probative of
the difficulties of creating a liberal, speech-protective culture in postwar Germany.  A
democracy is, of course, better functioning if respect for individual rights emerges from 
an unfettered electoral process rather than being imposed from above. See  COREY
BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 136–59
(2007).  But that does not entail that the German-Austrian approach is wrong, in context. 
33. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 219. 
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A. Milton 
Milton’s principal reason for opposing the licensing of printing is 
religious: free will means the freedom to choose evil.34 Salvation is to be
achieved only by struggle against temptation.35  “Assuredly we bring not
innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather: that which purifies 
us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary.”36  It follows that “all opinions, 
yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service and assistance
toward the speedy attainment of what is truest.”37  There’s nothing paradoxical 
here. Errors are needed because they are useful: “were they but as the
dust and cinders of our feet, so long as in that notion they may yet serve 
to polish and brighten the armoury of Truth, even for that respect they were 
not utterly to be cast away.”38  Milton thought that even correct religious
doctrine would not bring about salvation if it was the consequence of blind 
conformity rather than active engagement with religious questions.39  “A man
may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor 
says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, 
though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy.”40 
There is a limit. “I mean not tolerated popery and open superstition, 
which, as it extirpates all religions and civil supremacies, so itself should
be extirpate . . . that also which is impious or evil absolutely, either against
 34. JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 728 (Merritt 
Y. Hughes ed., 1957) [hereinafter MILTON, Areopagitica].
35. Id.
 36. Id.
 37. Id. at 727. The importance of a free choice between good and evil is likewise
emphasized in JOHN MILTON, Paradise Lost, in supra note 34, at 173, 260.  The speaker
here is God the Father, explaining why it was right to allow the rebel angels and, later,
Adam to transgress: 
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell. 

Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere 

Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love, 

Where only what they needs must do, appear’d, 

Not what they would? what praise could they receive?

What pleasure I from such obedience paid, 

When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice)

Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil’d,





 38. MILTON, Areopagitica, supra note 34, at 748. 
39. Id. at 739. 
40. Id.
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faith or manners, no law can possibly permit, that intends not to unlaw
itself.”41  It is not clear why he draws the line here.  Did he think that
the Catholics, because they did not themselves believe in—and indeed 
aimed to subvert—toleration, were therefore not entitled to it?42  Did he
think that Catholic speech was not about a matter reasonably in doubt, and 
so could not contribute to the advancement of truth?43 Was tolerance only 
for the “neighboring differences” of those committed to Protestantism?44 
Was Milton simply betraying his own principles?45  It is impossible to know. 
The answer most consistent with what Milton does say, in my view, is 
that he thought Catholicism really was too dangerous to tolerate.  He 
believed that there was a Catholic conspiracy to enslave England, and 
“swallowed whole the stories of Irish massacres of English Protestants.”46 
Although it was generally important to expose people to all sorts of evil 
ideas, Catholicism had to be suppressed in order to protect the project of 
Protestant liberalism.  If this reading is correct, then his limitation upon 
toleration does not look very different from Rawls’s.47 
B. Mill 
Mill likewise values “the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth produced by its collision with error.”48  If the reasons for even a true 
opinion are held without understanding the arguments both for and against 
it, “it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.”49  Truth held
dogmatically “is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to 
41. Id. at 747. 
42. See infra note 44 (noting that analogous arguments were made in the mid-
twentieth century to justify withholding free speech protection from Communists).
43. Ernest Sirluck, Introduction to THE COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON
(Ernest Sirluck ed. 1959),  reprinted in VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
124, 125–26 (2006). 
44. Willmoore Kendall, How to Read Milton’s Areopagitica, 22 J. POL. 439, 464 
(1960).
45. Thomas N. Corns, John Milton: The Prose Works (1998), reprinted in BLASI,
supra note 43, at 126–28. 
46. CHRISTOPHER HILL, MILTON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 155 (1977).
47. Stanley Fish takes up Rawls’s question, “How is it possible for those affirming 
a religious doctrine . . . based on religious authority . . . also to hold a reasonable political
conception that supports a just democratic regime?”  Stanley Fish, Where’s the Beef?, 51
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1042–43 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxxvii (extended
ed. 2005)).  Fish concludes: “The answer is that it is not possible,” at least with respect to 
“strong, that is uncompromising, religions.” Id. at 1043, 1038.  These are strange claims 
coming from one of our preeminent expositors of Milton.
48. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974) (1859); 
see also id. at 95. 
49. Id. at 97. 
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the words which enunciate a truth.”50  The pursuit matters more than the
attainment:  “Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due
study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those 
who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think.”51 
Even when a question is settled, “[t]he loss of so important an aid to the 
intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity
of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient
to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefit of its universal
recognition.”52 
As John Durham Peters observes, Mill’s ideal of character is an unstable
mix of Stoicism and romanticism.53  As listeners, citizens must be willing 
to subject their dearest beliefs to challenge and criticism, and learn to
articulate views the opposite of their own.54  Yet as speakers, they must 
present their ideas powerfully and with conviction.55 
The valuable traits of character promoted by a regime of free speech
have a negative counterpart in the malign effects of censorship. “The
greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole
mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of
heresy.”56  The consequence is “a low, abject, servile type of character,”57 
and Mill bombards it with nasty metaphors: automatons in human form, 
apes, cattle, sheep; he even borrows Milton’s metaphor of a “stagnant pool.”58 
For Mill, the limits of tolerable speech are a function of context: “An 
opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property 
is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the
press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited 
mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer.”59  Once more, as in 
Rawls, it depends on the circumstances.
 50. Id.
 51. Id. at 95. 
52. Id. at 106. 
53. JOHN DURHAM PETERS, COURTING THE ABYSS: FREE SPEECH AND THE LIBERAL 
TRADITION 130–36 (2005).
54. Id. at 130–32. 
55. Id. at 130–36. 
56. MILL, supra note 48, at 95. 
57. Id. at 114. 
58. Id. at 129. 
59. Id. at 119. 
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C. Meiklejohn
Alexander Meiklejohn directly confronted, in a more sustained way
than either Milton or Mill, the question whether those who reject liberalism 
are entitled to free speech.60 His response was that “a government is 
maintained by the free consent of its citizens only so long as the choice 
whether or not it shall be maintained is recognized as an open choice, 
which the people may debate and decide, with conflicting advocacies,
whenever they may choose.”61  His argument is essentially the same
as Milton’s: in order for the choice of good to be authentic, there must be 
a real option to choose evil. 
His clearest answer to the alleged paradox of tolerating the intolerant is 
this: 
Shall we, then, as practitioners of freedom, listen to ideas which, being opposed 
to our own, might destroy confidence in our form of government?  Shall we give
a hearing to those who hate and despise freedom, to those who, if they had the 
power, would destroy our institutions?  Certainly, yes! Our action must be guided, 
not by their principles, but by ours.  We listen, not because they desire to speak, 
but because we need to hear.  If there are arguments against our theory of 
government, our policies in war or in peace, we the citizens, the rulers, must hear
and consider them for ourselves.62 
If we were allowing ourselves to be guided by their principles, we would 
indeed be caught in a paradox.  Their principles aren’t ours.
For a long time in American law, the rule was that speech could be
suppressed whenever it had a tendency to bring about law violation.63 
This generated a real paradox. “Every denunciation of existing law,” Justice 
Brandeis observed, “tends in some measure to increase the probability that
there will be violation of it.”64  If, however, it is impermissible to say that
the laws on the books are bad and that the incumbent officeholders ought 
60. See Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-
Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 186–89 (1956); Robert Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (1971). 
61. Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L.
REV. 461, 468 (1953).  Another, similarly Miltonic formulation: “If men are not free to 
ask and to answer the question, ‘Shall the present form of our government be maintained
or changed?’; if, when that question is asked, the two sides of the issue are not equally
open for consideration, for advocacy, and for adoption, then it is impossible to speak of 
our government as established by the free choice of a self-governing people.”  ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 123
(1960).
62. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 61, at 57. 
63. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”:
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 9–12, 385–89, 395–402
(2000); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 129–176 (1997). 
64.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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to be replaced, then the enforcement of democratically enacted law
deprives the law of its own democratic legitimacy.65  A test that turned on 
the probability of harm was adopted by the Supreme Court in the mid-
twentieth century, with lamentable results.66  Those results pushed the law 
toward the current requirement that before speech can be suppressed as 
incitement, it must be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”67  We have had that 
rule for nearly half a century without untoward results, but its appropriateness 
from here on is contingent on the success of probabilistic judgments based
on local conditions that may change.68  Rawls is right that philosophy
alone cannot resolve the question of how much intolerant speech is tolerable.69 
III. MORAL DISTRESS
A last issue is the harm caused by speech—a question that is relevant 
to the contemporary hate speech debate.  Some hate speech does incite 
lawbreaking and even violence, and of course the law cannot be indifferent
to that.  More controversial is the question of how to respond to the mental 
distress caused by exposure to hateful ideas.  These have lately become
salient in the idea that college students should be given “trigger warnings” 
to enable them to avoid reading descriptions of especially distressing events,70 
65. James Madison thus made a sound argument from paradox to show that the
Sedition Act of 1798 was unconstitutional. See JAMES MADISON, The Virginia Report, in
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 243,
263–67 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981). 
66. See generally  MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS 175–83 (1984) (providing an historical overview of the judicially created clear 
and present danger test, including its tendency to suppress or restrict free speech). 
67.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
68. Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance, supra note 27, at 665–66. 
69. See RAWLS, supra note 15, at 192–93. 
70. See, e.g., Todd Gitlin, Please Be Disturbed: Triggering Can Be Good for You,
Kids, TABLET (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/189543/ 
trigger-warnings-on-campus [https://perma.cc/8GY3-3MMN]; Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan
Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind, ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/ [https:// 
perma.cc/BL2T-DG6R].  On the other hand, such warnings can be used in a smart way, to
provoke students to closer engagement with the material.  Aaron R. Hanlan, The Trigger 
Warning Myth, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 14, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/122543/ 
trigger-warning-myth [https://perma.cc/R6P2-BQ48]. 
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or that gay people should not have to see messages indicating that other
citizens regard their sexual activities as abhorrent.71 
As Jeremy Waldron has emphasized, when Mill balances liberty against 
harm, he cannot count as harm the moral distress of having your most
cherished views denounced, or of contemplating ways of life antithetical 
to your own.72  A core value of free speech is that it will and must induce
such distress. Mill, and liberalism more generally, places great value on 
“ethical confrontation—the open clash between earnestly held ideals and
opinions about the nature and basis of the good life.”73  Moral distress, 
“far from being a legitimate ground for interference . . . is a positive and
healthy sign that the processes of ethical confrontation that Mill called for 
are actually taking place.”74  Part of the reason for protecting illiberal ideas 
is that they promise to induce that distress, and so contribute to the education 
of citizens. 
This valorization of moral distress is not peculiar to Mill.  It is a central 
part of the free speech tradition.  John Durham Peters observes that, since 
Milton, the ideology of free speech has celebrated the ability to encounter 
evil ideas and come away unscathed.  “Satan represents a key figure in the 
dramatis personae of free expression, the troublemaker who nonetheless 
brings about, by the very force of his negativity, good in the end.”75 
Pornographers, Nazis, and other transgressors of the sacred thus form a 
stable alliance with civil libertarians.  Peters emphasizes the cultural
peculiarity of this valorization of “sponsoring study-abroad sojourns in 
the land of fire and brimstone.”76  Most cultures “do not train souls for the
kind of ironic contortionism that liberal subjectivity calls for.”77  Rather,
most of the world’s population “cannot hear certain things without wanting
to hit somebody.”78
 71. Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty 
Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125 (2016); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious 
Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619
(2015).
72. See Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, in LIBERAL RIGHTS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 115 (1993). 
73. Id. at 120. 
74. Id. at 125.  Waldron’s more recent call for restriction of hate speech is in tension 
with this argument. See Koppelman, Waldron, Responsibility-Rights, and Hate Speech, 
43 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 1201, 1215–21 (2012). 
75. PETERS, supra note 53, at 84. 
76. Id. at 14. 
77. Id. at 93. 
78. Id.
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Liberalism, with its core commitment to free speech, is a distinctive
cultural formation.  It values transparency among persons,79 and delights
in the difficult task of engaging other minds that are committed to values 
that one finds repellent.80 Developing facility with that task requires 
discipline, and that discipline is inconsistent with the notion that people 
are so fragile that they must be shielded from distressing or challenging 
ideas.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is nothing paradoxical about being tolerant when one’s own
commitments dictate tolerance.81  Probably the most repressive political 
entity on the planet, as this is written, is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), which deems it a religious duty to kill any Muslim who departs 
from its understanding of Islam—such as the world’s 200 million Shia.82 
In those territories unfortunate enough to be under its control, executions
of large groups of prisoners take place every few weeks.83  ISIS’s ongoing
program of mass murder however exempts “Christians who do not resist
their new government . . . . as long as they pay a special tax, known as the 
jizya, and acknowledge their subjugation.”84  ISIS regards Christianity as
false, but tolerates it, because it understands this to be a religious duty.  Is 
there a paradox of ISIS?  Is ISIS too broadminded to take its own side in 
a quarrel? 
For the same reason, there is nothing inconsistent about liberalism being 
broadly tolerant toward illiberal views, or even adopting William Galston’s
principle of “maximum feasible accommodation of diverse legitimate 
ways of life.”85
 79. See SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND
THE LAW 92 (2014).
80. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 226–56 (1990).
81. More generally, tolerance is not a single value, but a behavior that arises in 
many difficult cultural contexts, often for radically different reasons.  See Evan Haefeli, 
The Problem with the History of Toleration, in POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 105, 106, 
108 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2015). 





 85. WILLIAM A.GALSTON,LIBERAL PLURALISM:THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUEPLURALISM 
FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 119 (2002). 
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Alexander is right that some formulations of liberalism have committed
themselves to an unsustainable evaluative neutrality, that such a commitment 
would generate paradoxes, and that in fact any regime must be committed
at a fundamental level to its own ends and cannot tolerate actions that 
subvert those ends. The smartest proponents of liberal neutrality however 
never advocated neutrality at the level of philosophical justification.
Bruce Ackerman wrote that “it would be a category mistake to imagine
that there could be a Neutral justification for the practice of Neutral
justification—for Neutrality makes no sense except as part of the practice
it constitutes.”86  But many formulations failed to make this point clear. 
Liberal neutrality has occluded the cultural specificity of liberalism, the 
particular pattern of norms and ideals that constitute it.87  Trying to understand 
liberalism during the dominance of liberal neutrality theory is like trying 
to map one’s surroundings while passing through a fog.  Alexander appears 
to have been misled by the fog.  But fog eventually lifts. 
Liberalism is not paradoxical, but it does have characteristic tensions 
that make it what it is.  There are also tensions in a suspension bridge.  The 
bridge would not work without the tensions.  Those who would maintain it had
better know what it is that they are maintaining.
 86. Bruce Ackerman, What is Neutral About Neutrality?, 93 ETHICS 372, 387 (1983). 
87. There have of course been protests against this occlusion. See, e.g., WILLIAM 
A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1991); MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES, supra note 14. 
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